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 1 Introduction
In the last decades, experimental research on private provision of public goods
has been successfully conducted within the well-known Public Goods Game
(PGG) framework, where a low number of subjects are given an identical en-
dowment and allowed to either invest (possibly part of) it in a public account
or keep it in a private account. Lab evidence on both unrepeated PGGs and
ﬁrst rounds of repeated PGGs indicates that economic theory overestimates
the relevance of free riding, as in the aggregate subjects contribute signiﬁcantly
more than the canonical model of Homo Oeconomicus alone predicts. However,
experiments reveal that the observed rate of cooperation is associated with a
signiﬁcant degree of behavioral heterogeneity, as some players ride free on oth-
ers’ generosity, while other individuals contribute to the public account. In our
paper, we provide this experimental fact with evolutionary foundations as we
show, to our knowledge for the ﬁrst time, that stable coexistence between free
riders and so called strong reciprocators is possible, within a PGG setting.
2 The model
Let us consider a (very large) community of individuals continuously interact-
ing over time and enjoying the beneﬁts of a given collective good. Randomly
occurring encounters involve four players at a time, with a material PGG to be
played1. Each single player has to make a binary, ‘all-or-nothing’ choice: he
may either contribute to the public good (by giving a certain amount of money)
or free ride. Therefore, material consequences for the players depend on their
choosing between contribute (or ‘cooperate’, C) and free ride (or ‘defect’, D)
only. Further, we assume the good to be provided is a threshold public good:
actual provision occurs only insofar as a suﬃciently large proportion of individ-
uals do contribute to it (Cadsby and Maynes 1999). In particular, we suppose
that if nC is the number of players cooperating in each matching, nC = 2 is
the ‘critical threshold’ of cooperators needed for the public good to be privately
provided2. Hence, the material consequences of each 4-player interaction (for
the row player) are captured by the following payoﬀ matrix:
DDD DDC DCC CCC
D a a b c
C d e f g
(1)
Table 1 4-player PGG payoﬀ matrix
where:
c > b > e > a > d
1Well-known 4-player PGG experiments include Fehr and G¨ achter (2000), Fischbacher et
al. (2001), Masclet et al. (2003), Kurzban and Houser (2005) and Noussair and Soo (2008).
2Like in our model, most threshold PGG experiments assume that players can either decide
not to contribute or to contribute by a given amount.
1c > f
g > f > e 3 .
Let us suppose that two player types exist: Egoists and Strongly Reciprocal
players. We deﬁne an Egoist or Selﬁsh player (SEL) as a Homo Oeconomicus
who always plays D. By contrast, a Strong Reciprocator (SR) is willing to both
(conditionally) cooperate and incur costs in order to punish defectors4. As
Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) point out, available empirical evidence shows that
strong reciprocity is thus far the quantitatively most important type of social
preference. Further, experiments suggest that the presence of explicit, targeted
punishment opportunities crucially aﬀects the ﬁnal aggregate outcomes (see
Fehr and G¨ achter 2000 and Ones and Putterman 2007).
As Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) highlight, the answer to the question con-
cerning how the material payoﬀs of the individualistic and non-individualistic
agents compare in equilibrium at various population compositions crucially de-
pends inter alia on the extent of information agents have on their opponent’s
type. In this regard, though it has been argued that players tend to sub-
consciously signal their type via facial expressions and other emotional factors
(Frank 1988), economists have been skeptical towards the assumption that indi-
viduals can correctly identify their opponents’ ‘type’. In this light, we suppose
that SRs do not recognize their opponents’ type ex ante and that they bravely
play C in each matching5. However, we also assume that, after cooperating, they
can recognize their opponents’ type (ex post recognition assumption) and that
if SRs see that their opponent is a SEL, they are willing to incur material costs
in order to punish her, by displaying ‘altruistic punishment’. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that the level of punishment costs critically depends on the number
of SELs and SRs involved in the 4-player matching. As a consequence, each
matching will lead to one of the (material) outcomes captured by the matrix
below:
SEL,SEL,SEL SEL,SEL,SR SEL,SR,SR SR,SR,SR
SEL a a − ε
3 b − εc − 3ε
SR d − λe − λf − λg
(2)
Table 2 4-player matchings in a SEL-SR population
3By assuming that g > f > e, we are supposing that the threshold public good under study
also possesses the following feature. Once a speciﬁc provision-point (the ‘threshold’) is met
(Isaac et al. 1989), the amount of the public good may further increase, provided that the
aggregate level of contributions increases. This is equivalent to assuming that contributions
beyond the threshold levels, far from being wasted, result in further beneﬁts to the group. In
our model, this is captured by the assumption that the individual payoﬀ from playing C when
the other three players also cooperate (that is, g) is greater than the individual payoﬀ from
playing C when only two out of three opponents cooperate (that is,f), which in turn is greater
than the individual payoﬀ from playing C when only one of the three opponents cooperates
(that is, e).
4Kocher et al. (2008) run PGG experiments on three continents and show that both free
riding and conditional cooperation are ubiquitous, though the distribution of types diﬀers
across countries.
5This attitude resembles Sugden’s (1986) notion of ’brave reciprocity’.
2where λ> 0 indicates the cost of punishing and ε> 0 indicates the cost
of being punished. Expected payoﬀs can be calculated by using conditional
probabilities. By indicating with x and 1 − x the proportions of individuals of
the types SEL and SR, respectively, we have:
ΠSEL(x)=ax3 +( a −
ε
3
)x2(1 − x)+( b − ε)x(1 − x)2 +( c − 3ε)(1 − x)3
ΠSR(x) = (d − λ)x3 +( e − λ)x2(1 − x)+( f − λ)x(1 − x)2 + g(1 − x)3
The growth rates of the proportions are given by the well-known replicator
equations (Taylor and Jonker 1978). Replicator dynamics are a widely adopted
model of social (as well as natural) selection dynamics characterized by payoﬀ
monotonicity, where the most rewarding strategies spread over at the expense
of less rewarding ones (Weibull 1995). In this 2-type population, we analyze the
following replicator dynamics:
·
x = x(1 − x)(ΠSEL − ΠSR) (3)
where
·
x represents the time derivative of x. We suppose that social evo-
lution is driven by material payoﬀs only: players imitate the individuals who
achieve the best performances in purely material terms. As Ok and Vega-
Redondo (2001) observe: “it is possible that non-individualistic preferences are
materially more rewarding than individualistic preferences in certain strategic
environments” (p. 233).
3 Results
The payoﬀ diﬀerence in (3) can be written as:
ΠSEL − ΠSR = αx3 + βx2 + γx + δ (4)
where:
α := −f + b + λ +
7
3
ε + e − d + g − c
β := −2b +2 f − λ −
22
3
ε − e + a − 3g +3 c
γ := −f + b + λ +8 ε +3 g − 3c
δ := −g + c − 3ε
We can state the following results.
Proposition 1 Dynamics (3) are characterized by the following features:
1) Equation (3) always admits the stationary states x =0and x =1 .
2) At most three stationary states with x ∈ (0,1) can exist.
3) The stationary state x =1(where all players are SELs) is always locally
attracting.
34) The stationary state x =0(where all players are SRs) is locally attracting
if ε>
c−g
3 and repelling if ε<
c−g
3 .
5) At most one stationary state with x ∈ (0,1) can be attracting.
In Figure 1, by a numerical example, we show the complete taxonomy of
dynamic regimes that can be observed. Full (open) dots represent attracting
(repelling) stationary states.
Proposition 2 The basin of attraction of the ﬁxed point x =1(where all play-
ers are SELs) shrinks if (ceteris paribus) the cost of being punished ε increases
or if the cost of punishing λ decreases.
4 Conclusion
Almost two decades ago, in concluding their pioneering theoretical work on
the dynamics of free riding in PGG experiments, Miller and Andreoni (1991)
pointed out: “our understanding of the private provision of public goods may
be improved by more careful research into evolutionary game theory, and by
theory and experiments that examine the motives, decision processes, and dy-
namics of public goods games” (p 14). By using the evolutionary methodology,
we proceeded along these lines and succeeded in ‘mapping’ some robust ﬁnd-
ings emerging from last years’ growing experimental research on PGGs. On the
whole, with regard to a SEL-SR population where a 4-player PGG is continu-
ously played, we found that the equilibrium critically depends on both informa-
tion and behavioral assumptions concerning SRs. In particular, it is the case
that, under ex post recognition, coexistence of SELs and SRs may occur. Our
major result is that we are able to evolutionarily account for experimental evi-
dence by showing that the equilibrium population, far from being monomorphic,
is a mixture of selﬁsh and non-selﬁsh types6. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
work where such mixed equilibrium emerges within a PGG setting7. Finally,
in line with experimental evidence, we shed light on the crucial role played by
both the costs of punishment.
References
[1] Antoci A., Zarri L., 2008, On punishing non-punishers. When (not so) nice
guys deserve the stick, not the carrot, mimeo, University of Verona.
6Here we are able to reach this conclusion with reference to a PGG framework where 4-
player matchings continuously occur within a 2-type population, whereas Antoci and Zarri
(2008) show that this does not occur with pairwise random matchings (so that the material
PD, rather than the PGG, is played) and several 3-type populations (composed of Altruists,
Egoists and various forms of Strong Reciprocators).
7Under some conditions, Guttman (2000) ﬁnds stable coexistence of selﬁsh and unselﬁsh
players by studying a 2-type population made of opportunists and reciprocators. However,
he does not focus on a PGG framework. Further, in his model, all the players are expected
payoﬀ maximizers and reciprocators are not allowed to explicitly sanction defectors.
4[2] Cadsby C.B., Maynes E., 1999, Voluntary provision of threshold public
goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence, Journal of
Public Economics, 71, 53-73.
[3] Fehr E., Fischbacher U., 2005, The economics of strong reciprocity, in Gin-
tis H., Bowles S., Boyd R. and Fehr E. (eds), Moral sentiments and mate-
rial interests. The foundations of cooperation in economic life, Cambridge
(Mass.) and London, MIT Press, 151-91.
[4] Fehr E., G¨ achter S., 2000, Cooperation and punishment, American Eco-
nomic Review, 90, 4, 980-994.
[5] Fischbacher U., G¨ achter S., Fehr E., 2001, Are people conditionally coop-
erative? Evidence from a public goods experiment, Economics Letters, 71,
397-404.
[6] Frank R., 1988, Passions within reason: the strategic role of the emotions,
New York, Norton.
[7] Guttman J.M., 2000, On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reci-
procity, European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 31-50.
[8] Isaac R.M., Schmidtz D., Walker J.M., 1989, The assurance problem in a
laboratory market, Public Choice, 62, 217-236.
[9] Kocher M.G., Cherry T., Kroll S., Netzer R.J., Sutter M., 2008, Conditional
cooperation on three continents, Economics Letters, 101, 175-178.
[10] Kurzban R., Houser D., 2005, Experiments investigating cooperative types
in humans: A complement to evolutionary theory and simulations, Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102, 5, 1803-1807.
[11] Masclet D., Noussair C., Tucker S., Villeval M., 2003, Monetary and non-
monetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism, American
Economic Review, 93, 1, 366-380.
[12] Miller J.H., Andreoni J., 1991, Can evolutionary dynamics explain free
riding in experiments?, Economics Letters, 36, 9-15.
[13] Noussair C., Soo C., 2008, Voluntary contributions to a dynamic public
good: experimental evidence, Economics Letters, forthcoming.
[14] Ok E.A., Vega-Redondo F., 2001, On the evolution of individualistic pref-
erences: An incomplete information scenario, Journal of Economic Theory,
97, 231-254.
[15] Ones U., Putterman L., 2007, The ecology of collective action: A public
goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62, 495-521.
5[16] Sugden R., 1986, The economics of rights, co-operation and welfare, Oxford,
Basil Blackwell.
[17] Taylor, P. and L. Yonker (1978). Evolutionary stable strategies and game
dynamics, Mathematical Biosciences 40, 145-156.









 •  °  •
(b) ǫ =3 .82
0 1
 •  °  •  °  •
(c) ǫ =3 .9
0 1
 •  °  •
(d) ǫ =4 .2
Figure 1: Dynamic regimes of (3). The parameters’ values are: a =0 .3, b = 6,
c = 13.5, d =0 .1, e =0 .4, f = 1, g = 2, λ =0 .1.
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